New York Divorce Lawyers Explain Family and Matrimonial Law

Landmines In Child Support Part 1

A legal landmine is a mistake that I see people repeatedly make. The mistake is made because the person doesn’t realize he is making it, until it is too late. In New York family law and divorce law, there are several such landmines. In this post I will discuss the landmines in Child Support.

The one I see most frequently is failing to follow a court order of child support. At first blush, that may seem odd. How can some violate a support order and not realize it? Well, unfortunately, all to easily because a lot of people do not understand the nature of a court order.

Here’s how it normally plays out: Father is ordered by a court to pay $1000 a month in support. He does so for a while, then, he loses his job, get sicks or something else happens which makes it tough if not impossible for him to make his support payments. He goes to the mother and explains the situation and she agrees to take less, say $500 a month. They shake on the deal, and he now pays $500 a month, thinking all is good. A while later he gets served with papers for violating the court order. Not only must he pay the full $1000 a month, but he owes arrears on the time he was only paying $500. He’s shocked by the injustice: she agreed to the deal. The judge doesn’t see it that way, and the order for arrears is entered.

The problem that he didn’t understand is that a court order is just that: an order of the court. The mother has no authority to reduce the support. She cannot legally agree to lowering the support. Even if she put it in writing, he would still have to pay the full amount. In New York family and divorce law, once a court order is in place the only person who can modify the order is the judge (or family court support magistrate.) So, even if the parties have an agreement, the custodial parent can walk into divorce or family court and demand payment of the arrears and the court will grant it.

The only way to reduce the support payments is to go back to court and request it. In order to get a reduction, the non-custodial parent must demonstrate that there has been a unforeseeable change in circumstances. The court is very wary of guys claiming reduced income or to have lost their jobs. The court frequently sees guys voluntarily reducing or even hiding income to defeat the court order. However, I’ll get into reductions in another post. For now, the lesson is simple: once the court order is in place, obey it until you get another court order.

Ex Parte Foreign Nation Divorces

Although not as common as they used to be, ex parte foreign divorces are still an issue. By ex parte, we mean the court only had jurisdiction over one party. Back before New York eased, to some degree, its divorce laws, people found it easier to go to Nevada or Mexico to get a divorce. Typically, one party would go and it get. Since the court only had jurisdiction over the person before it, the divorce was “ex parte” (one party.) The New York courts were very concerned about this type of divorces, since with only one party showing up, there was a good chance that an injustice could be wrought on the absent spouse.

An ex parte foreign divorce where there was no service or appearance by the other party is generally void. In Matter of Levi, NYLJ Volume 215 Number 52 (Nassau County Surrogate 1996), the court recognized the long settled principle that ex parte foreign divorces are void. Surrogate Radigan found that the decedent and his first wife were not domiciled in the Dominican Republic at the time of the divorce. “Under the circumstances, the Dominican divorce is void where it is at best an ex parte foreign divorce decree.”

The foreign court must obtain jurisdiction over the proponent of the divorce as well as the absent spouse. In cases where a divorce has been obtained without any personal contact with the jurisdiction by either party or by physical submission to the jurisdiction by one, with no personal service of process within the foreign jurisdiction upon, and no appearance or submission by, the other, decision has been against the validity of the foreign decree. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709 (1965). In Maltese, the court found that the sole purpose of the wife’s trip to Mexico was to get the divorce.

it is clear that defendant’s appearance in Mexico was for the sole purpose of participating in the divorce proceeding, not for the purpose of residing there; she remained at all times a resident and domiciliary of New York State. As was said in the Rosenbaum case, supra, ‘Thus under comity as contrasted with full faith and credit our courts have power to deny even prima facie validity to the judgments of foreign countries for policy reasons, despite whatever allegations of jurisdiction may appear on the face of such foreign judgments. * * * The recognition of a foreign county judgment is far less certain, the judgment itself is far more assailable and vulnerable, than sister state judgments and is subject to a test of policy.’Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to a judgment declaring the Mexican divorce decree null and void,

Similarly, Surrogate Preminger found that a Mexican divorce was void where the decedent was not a domiciliary of Mexico , Matter of Barton, NYLJ Volume 222, Number 13 (N.Y. Surrogate Court 1999).

When a divorce decree is void, either party may attack it. Further, the party who obtained the divorce is not prevented from attacking it’s validity. See Marum v. Marum, 8 A.D.2d 975, 190 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2^nd Dept 1959).

The Domestic Relations Law, section 236B(2) specifically grants the court jurisdiction to determine issues of property distribution upon a foreign divorce.

Matrimonial actions. Except as provided in subdivision five of this part, the provisions of this part shall be applicable to actions for an annulment or dissolution of a marriage, for a divorce, for a separation, for a declaration of the nullity of a void marriage, for a declaration of the validity or nullity of a foreign judgment of divorce, for a declaration of the validity or nullity of a marriage, and to proceedings to obtain maintenance or a distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce, commenced on and after the effective date of this part. Any application which seeks a modification of a judgment, order or decree made in an action commenced prior to the effective date of this part shall be heard and determined in accordance with the provisions of part A of this section.

Emphasis added.

While a divorce granted by a foreign sister is accorded full faith and credit, “[i]t is equally well settled, however, that a valid ex parte foreign divorce terminates only the marital status of the parties. Such a divorce is ‘divisible’ in that it has no effect upon the property held by the parties outside the jurisdiction of the state issuing the judgment.” Peterson v. Goldberg, 180 A.D.2d 260, 585 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2^nd Dept 1992). See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 77 S.Ct. 1360 (1957) (Ex parte judgments from a foreign sister state resolving issues of support and property are not granted full faith and credit). “An ex parte foreign divorced decree is entitled to recognition to the extent of determining the marital status, though not to the extent of affecting personal rights stemming from the marital relationship such as property and custodial issues…” Matter of Childers, NYLJ Volume 222 Number 112 (New York County Surrogate’s Court, 1999).

The court in Mattwell v. Mattwell, 194 A.D.2d 715, 600 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2^nd Dept 1993) explained that the purpose of DRL § 236(B)(2) & (5) was to address the divisible nature of foreign divorces. Accordingly, to provide for the distribution of property not affected by a foreign judgment of divorce, Domestic Relations Law § 236B(2) and (5) provide that a divorced spouse who possesses an interest in marital property within this state may commence an action for equitable distribution of property… The court has the power to convert an action into one for equitable distribution following the entry of a foreign divorce. Peterson v. Goldberg, 180 A.D.2d 260, 585 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2^nd Dept 1992).

Therefore, in the case of valid ex parte foreign divorces the court has the power and authority under DRL 236B(2) and (5) to proceed to address and determine the issues of equitable distribution, custody, support and visitation.

Sometimes its not that easy to determine if a divorce is ex part. For example, assume that the couple is from the Dominican Republic. Both are legally in the United States, and residents of New York. Both are also still citizens of the Dominican Republic. Assume that one of the spouses goes back to the DR and obtains a legal and valid divorce and the other spouse remained in New York. Was it ex part or not? There would be an argument either way. At present I’m not aware of any case addressing this issue.

Therefore, let prudence be your guide and avoid any appearance of an ex-parte divorce. If you are looking for a divorce and you live in New York, consult a New York divorce lawyer. If you are looking for a quick solution, you might find that you have severely prejudiced your rights.

Delay tactics and Equitable Distribution

One question I get asked quite frequently is: if my spouse plays games in the divorce, can the court punish he/her by giving me the house?

To put that question is legalese: can the court alter the equitable distribution award if it finds that the spouse has been non-compliant or engages in frivolous conduct?

Recently, the Appellate Division for the First Department has answered in the case of Warner v. Houghton.

Under the New York Domestic Relations law, when making an award of equitable distribution the court must take in account the statutory factors found in section 236 B. The courts must consider these statutory factors when announcing the award. The factors are:

c. Marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties.
d. In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party;
(10) the tax consequences to each party;
(11) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;
(12) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration;
(13) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.

Turning to the Warner case, husband clearly was playing games. The husband fired his attorneys at least twice and failed and refused to attend a number of court conferences. Perhaps the straw that broke the camel’s back was his refusal to attend the inquest. Since the wife was unopposed at the inquest, the judge granted her everything she asked for.

The Appellate Division noted that “[w]hile the defendant’s conduct bordered on the contemptuous, the equitable distribution award must still be justified on the record, and should be supported by the specific finds [in the New York Domestic Relations Law].” The court cited an 1986 decision, Capasso v. Capasso, 119 AD2d 268, which held “that an insufficient explanation for the court’s distribution of property requires reversal of the judgment and remand for further consideration.”

The lesson of this case is that mere bad conduct may not be enough to allow the divorce court to alter the balance in an award of equitable distribution.

Professional Licenses, Property and Maintenance In a Divorce

Professional licenses can be one of the more contentious pieces of property in a divorce. A professional license, whether it is a medical license, law license, CPA or architect’s license has been declared to be marital property. The New York Court of Appeals made that determination over 20 years ago in the landmark decision of O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576; 489 N.E.2d 712; 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).

The facts in O’Brien were simple: the parties were married for nine years. At first, both were teachers. In September 1973 the parties moved to Guadalajara, Mexico, where plaintiff became a full-time medical student. While he pursued his studies defendant held several teaching and tutorial positions and contributed her earnings to their joint expenses. The parties returned to New York in December 1976 so that plaintiff could complete the last two semesters of medical school and internship training here. After they returned, defendant resumed her former teaching position and she remained in it at the time this action was commenced. Plaintiff was licensed to practice medicine in October 1980. He commenced this action for divorce two months later. At the time of trial, he was a resident in general surgery.

The Court appeals ruled that the license was martial property: “A professional license is a valuable property right, reflected in the money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder, which may not be revoked without due process of law (see, Matter of Bender v Board of Regents, 262 App Div 627, 631; People ex rel. Greenberg v Reid, 151 App Div 324, 326). That a professional license has no market value is irrelevant. Obviously, a license may not be alienated as may other property and for that reason the working spouse’s interest in it is limited. The Legislature has recognized that limitation, however, and has provided for an award in lieu of its actual distribution.

Remember, in O’Brien, the husband started the divorce only two months after he received his degree. Since he had no medical practice, all that the court could value was the license. But, what if the husband had been practicing medicine for 20 years and had a thriving practice? Would not the license merge with the practice? In other words, would there be only one piece of property to value: the practice? Or would the court value the license and practice?

That question was answered by the court ten years later in McSparron .v McSparron 87 N.Y.2d 275; 662 N.E.2d 745; 639 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1995). The facts are more detailed as this was a long term marriage.

The parties were married in 1969. At the time of their marriage, both parties had undergraduate college degrees and neither possessed any appreciable assets. Defendant husband attended law school during the first three years of the marriage, gaining admission to the Bar in 1973. He thereafter practiced law and was earning an annual salary of $ 97,000 as a Deputy First Assistant Attorney-General when the parties separated in mid-1989.

Plaintiff wife acquired a master’s degree in psychology during the early years of her marriage. Over the next 12 to 13 years, she worked as a school psychologist, taking time off occasionally to care for the couple’s children or to attend graduate school. In 1984, plaintiff began attending medical school. She graduated in 1988 and, after completing a one-year internship, she received a license to practice medicine in July of 1989. Plaintiff commenced this matrimonial action on September 1, 1989, four months before the completion of her second internship.

The Court specifically rejected the concept that the license merges with the career after a period of time. “Such a narrow approach is inconsistent with the equitable goal of assuring both spouses a fair share of all of the assets that were produced by the marital partnership. Application of the merger doctrine is particularly inimical to the statutory purposes because it generally favors the nonlicensed spouse in a shorter marriage over the nonlicensed spouse who is faced with rebuilding his or her economic life after the breakup of a long-term marriage.” Furthermore, care must be taken to ensure that the monetary value assigned to the license does not overlap with the value assigned to other marital assets that are derived from the license such as the licensed spouse’s professional practice. So, the New York Court of Appeals held that in New York Divorce, a professional practice is to be value separately from the license to practice.

This solution now raised a new problem: maintenance. Let’s say that the husband’s license and practice were collectively valued at $1.7 million. Of that sum, the wife’s share was determined to be $770,000. The wife also has asked for maintenance. Should the award of maintenance take into consideration the equitable distribution award of $770,000 or not?

The court addressed that question in Grunfeld v. Grunfeld 94 N.Y.2d 696; 731 N.E.2d 142; 709 N.Y.S.2d 486 (2000). The court split a few hairs here. In Grunfeld, the husband’s law license and practice were valued separately, then the wife was awarded maintenance. The Court of Appeals reversed the appellation division’s decision that did not fully take into account the equitable distribution award. “Here, however, the Appellate Division flatly based its ruling in part on the fact that “defendant’s future earnings”–which only could be expected to come from his own professional endeavors–were likely “to exceed $ 1 million yearly.” Additionally, the Court apparently recognized that income from other resources could only be expected to support “a portion of the maintenance.” Therefore, on the face of the Appellate Division’s decision, in ordering full distribution of plaintiff’s share of defendant’s license without any adjustment of maintenance, the Court engaged in double counting of income. This is inconsistent with McSparron. Thus, that portion of its order cannot be affirmed.”

The appellation division was reversed because the award took into account increased income from the husband’s law practice. But, the Court of Appeals left open the viability of an award of maintenance derived from sources other then the practice. It is possible that if the husband had incoming producing separate property, then the concern about offsetting would not exist.

In conclusion, divorces involve licenses can be complicated as they involve several issues of equitable distribution and maintenance. The valuation of the property can be complicated and expensive. In New York, the judges will order that a forensic account value the practice and the license. These numbers will drive the decisions on the distribution and the ultimate award of maintenance.